The Access of the Young Graduates in Sciences into RD Profession: A Switching Model Treatment for the French Case by Bonnard, Claire
HAL Id: halshs-00671315
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00671315
Submitted on 27 Nov 2018
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
The Access of the Young Graduates in Sciences into RD
Profession: A Switching Model Treatment for the
French Case
Claire Bonnard
To cite this version:
Claire Bonnard. The Access of the Young Graduates in Sciences into RD Profession: A Switching
Model Treatment for the French Case. LABOUR, Wiley, 2012, 26 (1), pp.46-65. ￿10.1111/j.1467-
9914.2011.00535.x￿. ￿halshs-00671315￿
The Access of the Young Graduates in Sciences into R&D Profession: A 
Switching Model Treatment for the French Case 
 
Claire Bonnard 
 
Published in Labour, Volume 26, Issue 1, 2012, p. 23-38 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9914.2011.00535.x 
 
 
Abstract. We address the question concerning the choice of graduates in sciences and 
engineering to look for employment in research and development. We use an endogenous 
switching regression to avoid the existence of self-selection biases. The study shows that 
human capital is decisive where both employment opportunities and remuneration are 
concerned within, but not without, this sector. The results also suggest that in the early stages 
of a career, the R&D sector is less rewarding than other types of employment only for doctors 
and not for graduates from engineering schools. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Because of the current policy as regards the development of innovation, scientific 
employment in the private sector is now considered a major issue. Indeed, Redor (2004) 
showed that ‘the number and qualifications of researchers, but also their internal mobility, are 
factors underlying the innovation capacity of firms’. The fear of a shortage of young 
researchers and engineers, in particular the declining number of graduates getting involved in 
scientific professions, is the subject of much debate both in the USA (Brown and Linden, 
2008; Butz et al., 2003) and in the European Union (Becker, 2010; Gago, 2004). However few 
studies have focused on the opportunities of young graduates to get involved in R&D or the 
potential wage returns for choosing such a career. 
In France, the number of publications does not seem to be a criterion for recruitment in the 
private sector (Giret et al., 2007; Mangematin, 2000), unlike what happens in the academic 
sector. Moreover, the productivity of researchers in the private sector has not been deeply 
studied. In this paper, we inquire into the decisive factors making it possible to secure a 
position in R&D. In the course of the hiring process, do employers assess only the human 
capital of young graduates or do they use other sources of information, like signals such as the 
networks in which graduates participate or the companies in which they were trainees? 
The data are taken from the survey ‘Generation 2004’ conducted by the CEREQ.1 This survey 
involved about 33,000 people interviewed in 2007 about the context of the degree of their 
involvement in the labour force, 3 years after they had left school. This study only focuses on 
graduates having had at least 5 years of higher education, attended scientific curricula and 
1 Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur les Qualifications 
                                            
who are working in the private sector, the subsample after this selection representing about 
1,100 people. We choose an endogenous regression model (‘endogenous switching 
regression’), also called the ‘Mover/Stayer’ model, to address the existence of self-selection 
biases. We can indeed assume that unobservable characteristics affecting both the fact of 
working in R&D and wages determination may lead to selection biases. This method makes it 
possible to put into place both an estimate of earnings functions and a selection equation 
based on the full information maximum-likelihood (FIML) method. 
First, the determinants that allow graduates to get employment in private-sector R&D were 
analysed for graduates in sciences. The models were estimated separately for doctors and 
graduates from engineering schools, in order to determine whether there is a ‘differentiation’ 
in selection for R&D employment between these two degrees. The remuneration of graduates 
was then analysed in both research and non-research sectors. This analysis will in particular 
enable us to compare the return on investment based on wages, for the various degrees and for 
both types of employment. Finally, conditional and unconditional wages were predicted, 
based on the estimated parameters in order to measure the significance in wage gap between 
R&D and other types of employment for each type of degree awarded. 
 
2. Review of literature on the determinants of the access to R&D 
 
2.1 Access to R&D 
 
In the private sector, it is difficult for employers to determine the productivity of a young 
researcher during the recruitment process. Indeed, R&D workers are engaged in tasks that are 
primarily cognitive and before hiring a scientist, the employer cannot easily determine the 
abilities of the scientist to solve problems, to innovate and performs tasks (Zenger and 
Lazzarini, 2004). In the academic sector, the productivity of a young researcher can indeed be 
estimated, by considering, for instance, the number of publications he/she has made (Levin 
and Stephan, 1991). But some studies dealing with the French case (Giret et al., 2007; 
Mangematin, 2000) showed that the number of publications did not appear to be a criterion 
for recruitment in the private sector. Moreover, we can note that the productivity of 
researchers in the private sector has not been studied much in terms of pure economic 
efficiency. What are the determinants making it possible to secure an R&D position? When 
hiring, do employers take into account only the human capital of graduates (degree, 
professional experience) or also other signals such as networks graduates are part of or the 
colleges that they graduated from? 
 
2.1.1. The role of the degree.  
 
According to Stephan (quoted by Graham and Smith, 2005), the Science and Engineering 
(S&E) profession gives more significance to measurable skills and knowledge than to less 
tangible traits such as personality or appearance (which may carry greater weight in some 
non-S&E jobs such as management, sales and services). In this perspective, a doctor’s  degree  
should  be  given  priority  by  companies  over  other  types of degrees where R&D positions 
are concerned, especially as the current policy aims to bring together academia and private 
R&D laboratories. However, companies still have a marked preference for graduates from 
engineering schools at the expense of doctors (Observatoire de l’emploi scientifique, 2007). 
In literature, this phenomenon is primarily explained by the fact that companies blame doctors 
for not knowing the business world well enough as graduates from engineering schools 
generally train for long periods of time in companies (Duhautois and Maublanc, 2005, 2006). 
On the other hand, during their careers, researchers in the private sector will often choose to 
work in other sectors such as managerial positions (Biddle and Roberts, 1994), production and 
marketing (Beltramo et al., 2000 ; Duhautois and Maublanc, 2005). Companies, therefore, 
prefer hiring graduates from engineering schools because they believe that these graduates 
gained broader knowledge and acquired the management skills needed to move to other types 
of positions, unlike doctors. 
We can assume that the professional experience of a graduate, associated with his/her human 
capital, is also crucial to a position in R&D. Indeed, as we have seen, it appears that the 
preference for engineering schools is mainly due to the experience engineering graduates 
acquired during their studies. Some studies also showed that doctors who work in the private 
sector are those who were corporate trainees during their PhD degree. This professional 
experience was acquired through the funding they received during their doctorate (fellowship 
CIFRE2) or because they signed research contracts with the private sector (Giret et al., 2007; 
Mangematin, 2000). 
 
2.1.2. Colleges and universities.  
 
The colleges in which graduates studied may also be used as a criterion during the recruitment 
process. For example, Rebick (2000) showed that, in Japan, the ties between universities and 
companies allow employers to reduce research costs and minimize mismatch in the course of 
employee selection. He underlined the fact that science teachers can, in some cases, be used 
as references by placing their best students in companies in which they themselves have 
connections. These connections also enable graduates to know of the job opportunities in 
these companies. Lam (2001) also showed that companies tend to maintain close links with 
universities to target the best students and have influence on their training, a fact the author 
calls ‘extended internal market’. She stressed that these networks offer the recruiter more 
information on the quality of skills of the applicant than his/her degree does. Finally, 
companies can also rely on the prestige of the universities (especially engineering schools) 
applicants graduated from. Indeed, in France, the prestige of the various engineering schools 
is well known by companies, in particular by the annual rankings published in various 
magazines and newspapers. 
 
2.1.3. Acquaintances and graduates’ networks.  
 
2 CIFRE (Industrial Convention of Training through Research) is an industrial fellowship 
                                            
On the other hand, employers may use a spe- cific factor, an ‘informal’ signal (Saloner, 1985), 
during the recruitment process of young researchers. A great number of studies analysed the 
role of social networks in recruitment. Granovetter (1995) showed the informational role of 
social networks on the labour market. According to this author, networks enable employers 
and employees alike to obtain better and more reliable information during the recruitment 
process. In the case of R&D positions, Simon and Warner (1992) showed, for example, that 
employers use former graduates’ networks during the hiring process of young researchers in 
order to reduce uncertainty about the productivity of future employees. In a more recent study, 
Mangematin (2000) also pointed out that doctors often use social networks in order to find 
employment in the private sector. 
 
2.2 Starting wages 
 
According to Weiss (1980), when uncertainty about the capabilities of individuals is 
important, the employer may decide to offer higher starting wages to attract the most talented 
individuals. At the same time, uncertainty about the productivity of the young researcher may 
have the opposite effect on starting wages. Mishagina (2008) shows that as at the beginning of 
their careers, information on the productivity of young researchers is not available, the 
employer may decide to offer lower wages to individuals working in research compared with 
those working in other sectors. When information on the capabilities of the individual to do 
research is revealed, the less productive researchers move on to different positions, whereas 
the most productive stay in research and will have a higher wage growth. Moen (2005) finds a 
similar wage profile. Conversely, according to the author, R&D can be seen as an investment 
in human capital by the young graduate that can then be exploited in another company or in a 
different position. Nevertheless, some empirical studies do not seem to confirm this analysis. 
In France, Beltramo and Paul (1994) and Bourdon and Paul (1992) show that early career 
earnings in R&D are significantly lower than in non-research sectors for graduates of 
engineering schools. They also stress that this wage gap grows throughout the careers of 
engineers. The same result is found in England by Roberts (2002) and Holland (Dupuy and 
Smits, 2009). The hypothesis put forward to explain this result is the existence of a ‘taste for 
research’ on the part of researchers. According to this hypothesis, researchers are willing to 
‘pay’ for doing research. The study of Stern (2004) seems to confirm this hypothesis. Indeed, 
as is shown in the USA, doctors of biology are willing to accept lower wages if their job 
allows them to do their research and publish it. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition 
 
The simplest method in order to estimate the profitability of R&D work is to build a ‘single 
equation’ by ordinary least squares (OLS) as follows: 
 
log (wi ) = βR&Di R&D + βi xi  + εi.  [1] 
  
In this model, wi represents the annual wages, xi represents several independent variables 
standing for individual characteristics, and R&D is a dummy variable corresponding to either 
a ‘research’ or a ‘non-research’ position. The value and significance of the coefficient bR&D 
determines the wage gap between the two types of activities. A disadvantage of this approach 
is that the returns to individual characteristics have to be equal for all positions. An alternative 
approach is the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. This method developed by Blinder (1973) 
and Oaxaca (1973) makes it possible to divide the wage gap into two components: an 
‘endowments effect’ and a ‘coefficient effect’. The ‘endowments effect’ is the element 
explained by differences between individual characteristics. The second component 
corresponds to the ‘unexplained’ part and is interpreted as providing a measure of whether an 
identical graduate holding the same position in R&D or other sectors would receive the same 
wages (Melly, 2005). 
First, this method involves estimating a wage equation separately for graduates working in 
R&D and those working in other sectors: 
 
log (wi) j = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ,  j= R&D, OR&D [2] 
 
Then, we calculate: 
 log(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷  −  log(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 = �𝑋𝑋𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 −  𝑋𝑋𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷� ?̂?𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷+ 𝑋𝑋𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷  (?̂?𝛽𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 −  ?̂?𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷). 
  
In this equation log (wt ) j  and 𝑋𝑋
𝑗𝑗
  are the average wage log and the average characteristics of 
graduates in each activity j. The first part of the decomposition represents the proportion 
accounted for by differences between average characteristics (‘endowment effect’) and the 
second part represents the proportion accounted for by differences between the profitability 
levels indicated by these characteristics (‘coefficient effect’).3 
 
3.2 Switching regression: Mover/Stayer model 
 
The Oaxaca–Blinder method may seem unsatisfactory because it does not take into account 
the unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, the ‘unexplained part’ may reflect only differences 
between unobservable characteristics among the two types of graduates. Some studies (Giret 
et al., 2003; Lassibille, 2001) suggest that unobservable characteristics affecting both research 
work and wages exist and may lead to selection biases. Indeed, it seems that R&D employees 
tend to have a particular motivation, ‘a taste for research’. This motivation cannot be observed 
by the economist and may bias the estimation results. Several methods can be used to take 
into account the existence of such biases. The model usually used is the two-step method by 
3 The difficulty in the decomposition is the choice of weights. To test the robustness of the results, we also perform the 
decomposition where we weight the difference in average characteristics by ?̂?𝛽𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷. Results do not change significantly. 
                                            
Heckman (1979). For this paper, we used the Mover/Stayer model, also called ‘endogenous 
switching regression’. Unlike the Heckman procedure, this method allows us to estimate 
simultaneously earnings functions and a selection equation based on the FIML method, 
allowing us to obtain more reliable standard errors (Lokshin and Zurab, 2004). 
The model takes the following form: 
 
ln w1i  = β1Xli  + ε1i [3] 
 
ln w0i = β0 X0i  + ε0i  [4] 
 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖
∗= δ (lnw1i − lnw0i ) + Zi γ + ui. [5] 
 
Equations [3] and [4] are earnings functions respectively for the research and non-research 
sectors. w1i and w0i are respectively the wages in research and non-research positions. X1i and 
X0i are human and social capital variables that allow us to explain wages. Equation 5 is the 
selection equation, where 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ is a latent variable determining the choice that a graduate has to 
make between working in the research sector or elsewhere. As 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ cannot be observed by the 
researcher, it is a dichotomous variable where I = 1 if graduates choose to work in research 
and 0 if they choose to work in other sectors; the result is: 
 
Ii = 1 if 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ > 0 
 
Ii  = 0 otherwise. 
 
Zi is a set of variables affecting the choice of working in one of the two defined sectors plus 
instrumental variables. Instrumental variables must not have direct impact on wages. Ui, ε1i, 
and ε2i are error terms respectively of the selection equation and the earnings function. The 
model also estimates the correlation coefficients between ε1i and ui and ε0i and ui, called p1 
and p0. Particular attention should be paid to these coefficients. Indeed, if p0 or p1 is 
statistically different from zero, the error term of the selection equation is correlated with 
error terms of wage equations. In other words, the selection within a particular sector is 
endogenous to wages. Unobserved characteristics or preferences influencing the fact of 
working in research or in a different sector probably affect graduates’ wages once they are 
employed (Lokshin and Zurab, 2004). 
 
Table 1.  Correlation coefficients 
  
p1 p0 Selection in R&D Selection in non-
R&D 
+ + + - 
+ - + + 
- + - - 
- + - - 
 
3.3 Study of correlation coefficients 
 
The study of correlation coefficients is interesting because it determines whether there is a 
‘positive’ or ‘negative’ selection in research and non-research sectors. For the analysis of 
coefficients, we made use of the methodology of Maddala (1983) and Hamilton and 
Nickerson (2003). After estimating the models, four situations may arise that are presented in 
Table 1. 
 
3.4 Analysis of the wage gap between the R&D sector and non-research sectors 
 
The Mover/Stayer model enables us to calculate the wage gap by taking into account selection 
biases. Indeed, after estimating the models, it is possible to calculate the following: 
  
yc1_1i  = E ( y1i  | Ii  = 1, x1i ) = x1i β1 + σ1ρ1 f (γ Zi ) / F (γ Zi )  [6] 
   
yc0_0i  = E ( y0i  | Ii  = 0, x0i ) = x0i β0 + σ0ρ0 f (γ Zi ) / (1- F (γ Zi )) [7] 
   
yc0_1i  = E ( y0i  | Ii  = 1, x1i ) = x1i β0 + σ0ρ0 f (γ Zi ) / F (γ Zi ) [8] 
   
yc1_0i  = E ( y1i  | Ii  = 1, x0i ) = x0i β1 + σ1ρ1 f (γ Zi ) / (1- F (γ Zi )). [9] 
  
yc1_1i (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦00𝑖𝑖) are predicted wages of graduates currently working in R&D (in non-research 
positions) conditionally to the fact that they are working in R&D (in non-research positions). 
yc0_1i and yc1_0i are counterfactual wages. They actually correspond to the wages of graduates 
currently working in R&D (non-research positions) if they were working in non-research 
positions (R&D). 
From these predicted wages, two indicators can be constructed: 
 
(1) ∏ =1  𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1_1𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0_1𝑖𝑖   
(2) ∏ =0  𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1_0𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0_0𝑖𝑖   
 
P1 measures the wage difference between the wages earned in R&D and the wages earned in 
a different sector for graduates who are currently working in research. If P1 is positive 
(negative), the R&D sector is more (less) lucrative than non-research sectors for graduates 
currently employed in R&D. 
P0 measures the wage difference between the wages earned in R&D and the wages earned in 
non-research sectors for graduates who are currently working in non-research sectors. In this 
case, if P0 is positive (negative), the R&D sector is more (less) lucrative than non-research 
sectors for graduates currently employed in non-research sectors. The models are estimated in 
Stata.4 
 
 
4. Data presentation 
 
The data are taken from the survey ‘Generation 2004’ conducted by the CEREQ. This study 
involved about 33,000 people interviewed in 2007 on vocational integration, 3 years after they 
left the educational  system.  The  survey  data  give  further  information  about the person 
and the position he holds 3 years after graduation. In the sample, 1,059 graduates have studied 
at least 5 years in a scientific field and are employed in the private sector. 
31.5 per cent of these graduates are working in R&D5  and 68.5 per cent are employed in non-
research sectors. 
 
 
4.1 Individual variables 
 
Individual variables are the gender and the qualifications of the subject, the subject of the 
degree he has and the number of months he has been working. In the model including 
engineers, we also took into account the fact that an engineer may have obtained a different 
degree from his engineer’s degree. In the model including doctors, we also took into 
consideration the facts that a doctor completed a work placement6 during his/her studies, the 
type of financing (CIFRE) he or she received and his/her career plans throughout the 
doctorate (academic research/other plans). Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix B: 
Table B1 for doctors and B2 for engineers. 
 
 
4.2 Social capital variables 
 
The ‘social capital’ variable is taken from the following question of the survey: How did you 
know there was a job opportunity in this company? Possible answers are: through an agency 
(ANPE, Mission locale, PAIO or APEC7), your former school, one of your acquaintances, an 
advertisement (newspapers, the Internet), through a spontaneous application and finally, other 
people. 
Acquaintances and classified ads represent  the  most  important  recruitment  methods for 
graduates. Indeed, 50 per cent of graduates on average knew of the existence of a job 
opportunity leading to a hiring process in one of these two ways. Doctors seem to rely more 
on their acquaintances than other graduates (35 per cent against 22 per cent). Mangematin 
(2000) pointed out that doctors often use their contacts to find jobs in the private sector. Table 
4 The movestay command is used to estimate models. 
5 To define the R&D activities, we use the nomenclature developed by Audric-Lerenard and Topol (1999) (see Appendix A). 
6 For the work placement, the doctors who received a CIFRE funding are not taken into account. 
7 ANPE: French national employment agency; APEC: employment agency for professionals and managers; PAIO: career 
information centers. 
                                            
2 shows a differentiation in the process used for going in and out between the two sectors. 
Indeed, a higher proportion of graduates working in non-research sectors knew of the 
existence of a job opportunity by sending spontaneous application letters or reading the 
classified ads, whereas a higher proportion of graduates holding research positions seem to 
have used information provided by their former colleges. 
 
 
4.3 Variables for engineering schools 
 
In the model including engineers, it is also taken into account whether the engineer graduated 
from a ‘prestigious’ school.  
 
Table 2. How did you know there was a working opportunity in this company? 
 Engineers Doctors 
(In %) R&D Non-R&D Total R&D Non-R&D Total 
spontaneous  application 13.1 15.1 14.6 9.1 11.7 10.1 
Organization 12.0 7.8 9.0 5.8 11.7 8.1 
One of your acquaintances 20.9 22.9 22.4 34.6 35.0 34.8 
Advertisement 24.6 26.2 25.8 24.0 24.8 24.3 
Former school 11.5 8.6 9.4 13.9 5.1 10.4 
Others 17.8 19.3 18.9 12.5 11.7 12.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 3.  Engineering schools 
(% of engineers) R&D Non-R&D Total 
Prestigious schools 12.0 9.4 10.1 
R&D schools 22.5 15.1 17.1 
 
 
On the other hand, the way in which ‘Industrie et Technologies’ (2007) ranked the engineering 
schools of the sample seems to indicate that these schools can be ranked by considering the 
quantity of funds (technical services, R&D benefits from enrolment in European programs) 
they received when doing business with companies in 2006. The first 20 schools were brought 
together under a variable called ‘R&D schools’. These schools have an average turnover of 
3.15 million Euros. This variable was built because we can assume that these schools have 
close links with corporate R&D laboratories. 
Table 3 shows that twelve per cent of engineers working in R&D graduated from a 
‘prestigious school’ against 9.4 per cent of engineers working in non-research sectors. On the 
other hand, 22.5 per cent of engineers in R&D graduated from ‘R&D schools’ against 15.1 
per cent of graduates in non-research sectors. 
 
4.4 Instrumental variables 
 
In the selection equation, an instrumental variable documents the choice between the two 
sectors but the absence of an impact on wages must be taken into account.8 The variable 
chosen involves the career plans of graduates on the day they finished high school. Indeed, 
Fox and Stephan (2001) pointed out that considering a career in science is often considered by 
students as teenagers. This variable is based on items related to the profession and the field 
graduates wanted to work in by the time they had finished high school. It presents six terms: 
by the time he has finished high school, the graduate wants to work in research, science, 
computing, engineering, in another field or he does not have any plan. 
Overall, a higher proportion of graduates in non-research sectors had no career plans during 
their last year of high school compared with graduates currently in the research sector (around 
20 per cent against 15 per cent). People hired in the sector were more frequently planning to 
work in the research sector, in science or engineering. Conversely, a small proportion of them 
wanted to work in computing (3.7 per cent against 14 per cent for graduates currently holding 
different positions). Finally, concerning the estimates for doctors, an instrumental variable is 
added to consider whether a doctor made a post-doctorate work placement. Indeed, Recotillet 
(2007) showed that a post-doctoral work placement can play the role of a signal at an early 
stage in the careers of doctors but is not synonymous with earning more in the private sector. 
In the sample, 40.9 per cent of doctors working in research undertook a post-doctoral work 
placement whereas 24.8 per cent of them hired in an area other than research did so. 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Access to R&D: analysis of the results of the selection equation 
 
For all estimates, the independence test (Wald test) is rejected and replaced by the joint 
dependence of the error terms of the models. The adoption of a ‘Mover/Stayer’ model is 
therefore justified in comparison with an estimate by OLS or Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. 
 
5.1.1 Doctors (the results are presented in Table 4). The way a doctor financed his/her 
studies is crucial to getting a position in private sector R&D. Indeed, if a doctor received 
funding from CIFRE during his/her studies, it greatly increases the probability of getting a 
position in private sector R&D compared with a doctor who received another type of 
financing. The previous degree of a doctor (engineering schools versus university) seems to 
have no impact on the probability of getting involved in R&D. On the other hand, the fact that 
a doctor did a work placement during his/her studies is strongly positive and significant. The 
field in which a doctor studied has no significant impact on his/her joining R&D. The fact that 
the graduate knew of the existence of the job opportunity does not affect the probability of 
finding jobs in research. Indeed, none of the ways used has a significant impact compared 
with using acquaintances. The two instrumental variables are significant. The fact of having 
done a post-doctoral work placement greatly increases the possibilities of becoming a 
8 There is no real test to assess the exogeneity of instrumental variables. However, these variables are non-significant in the naïve regression 
for log wage. 
 
                                            
researcher. Wanting to work in research during the last year of high school also has a 
significant positive impact. In contrast, considering career plans during the PhD has no 
significant impact. Given these results, professional experience in companies and in private 
sector research acquired before and during the PhD (CIFRE, work placement) seems to be the 
selection factor that determines whether or not the candidate will get a position in private 
sector R&D. 
 
5.1.2 Graduates from engineering schools. Table 5 shows different results for graduates 
from engineering school. 
Compared with graduates in technology, engineering graduates majoring in ‘math- 
computing’ are less likely to join R&D, whereas engineering graduates majoring in 
‘mechanics’ stand a better chance. Among the methods of job hunting used by a graduate, 
only the fact of relying on an organization has a significant positive impact (10 per cent) on 
getting involved in R&D compared with relying on acquaintances. If we refer to the 
engineering school from which the applicant graduated, the fact of graduating from a 
prestigious school has a positive but not significant impact on the fact of working in research. 
On the contrary, the fact that the applicant graduated from a ‘R&D school’ greatly increases 
the opportunities of becoming a researcher (significant at 5 per cent). It seems, therefore, that 
engineers who graduated from a school that is often in contact with the R&D laboratories of 
companies will be more likely to work in research sectors. Finally, the instrumental variable is 
significant. Indeed, engineers who want to work in research, in science, or as in engineering 
are more likely to find a job in research sectors compared with graduates who do not have 
plans during the last year of high school. 
  
Table 4. Selection equation 
  Selection equation for doctors Dependent variable: 
research 
Constant  -0.299 
(0.69) 
Previous degree 
Ref. From university 
Engineering schools 
 
 
0.256 
(1.49) 
Men  -0.393** 
(2.31) 
Funding during doctorate 
Ref. Other financing 
CIFRE 
 
 
0.842*** 
(3.65) 
Field of study 
Ref. Engineering sciences 
Chemistry 
 
 
0.146 
(0.60) 
Maths-Physics-Computing  -0.319 
(1.64) 
Biology  0.195 
(0.60) 
Work placement 0.418** 
(2.41) 
Number of months in employment 0.014 
(1.50) 
Ways used 
Ref. Acquaintances 
An organization  
 
 
-0.345 
(1.25) 
A spontaneous application -0.234 
(0.94) 
An advertisement  0.062 
(0.33) 
Former school  
 
0.356 
(1.27) 
Others 0.011 
(0.04) 
Career plans during doctorate  
Ref. Work in the private sector 
Work in public research  
 
 
0.203 
(1.26) 
Post-doctorate work placement 0.363*** 
(2.60) 
Career plans at the end of high school (baccalauréat) 
Ref. Other project 
 
Research-Science  0.249** 
(1.99) 
No plans  0.078 
(0.46) 
N  345 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% 
levels. 
 
Table 5. Selection equation for engineers 
 Selection equation Dependent variable: research 
Constant  -0.948*** 
(2.62) 
Men  0.076 
(0.60) 
Field of study 
Ref. Technology 
 
Maths-Physics-Computing  -0.548*** 
(2.61) 
Agronomy  -0.230 
(1.19) 
Other fields of engineering sciences  -0.0173 
(0.97) 
Mechanics  0.273* 
(1.92) 
Biology-Chemistry  0.194 
(0.89) 
Number of months in employment  0.001 
(0.12) 
Ways used 
Ref. Acquaintances 
An organization 
 
 
0.328* 
(1.68) 
A spontaneous application  -0.071 
(0.42) 
An advertisement  0.026 
(0.18) 
Your training organization  0.267 
(1.37) 
Others  0.024 
(0.16) 
Different degree (from engineer’s)  -0.202 
(1.00) 
Prestigious school  0.113 
(0.60) 
R&D school  0.306** 
(2.30) 
Career plans at the end of high school (baccalauréat) 
Réf. No plan 
 
Research-Science  0.374** 
(2.46) 
Engineering  0.297** 
(2.45) 
Computing  -0.186 
(0.97) 
Other project  0.221* 
(2.02) 
N  714 
Notes:  Absolute  value  of  z  statistics  in  brackets.  ***,  **,  and  *  indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 
10% levels. 
  
 
5.2 Wages in R&D: earnings functions 
 
After estimating the selection equation, we can introduce selection effects in wage equations.9 
The wage equations for doctors and engineers are respectively presented in Table 6 and in 
Table 7. 
 
 
5.2.1 Doctors. The funding received by a doctor while he/she was preparing his/her 
doctorate has a wage impact on both types of sectors. Indeed, the CIFRE funding is assessed 
in both the research sector (18.3 per cent) and the non-research sector (22 per cent). A 
previous degree from another engineering school results in wage gains (significant at 10 per 
cent) only in other areas than research. On the other hand, a work placement10 has a 
significant positive coefficient in both sectors. The wages of a doctor who did a work 
placement during his/her studies will be higher by 9 per cent in R&D and 14 per cent in non-
research sectors. The subject of the PhD degree appears to have no impact on wages in both 
types of positions. The fact that a doctor wanted to work in public research has a significantly 
negative impact in research and non-research sectors. Bender and Heywood (2006) showed 
that doctors in science working in different sectors than the one they planned to work in 
during their studies have a low level of satisfaction and lower incomes. Regarding the 
recruitment process, the fact of contacting their former colleges has a positive impact for 
doctors, whereas the fact of relying on a university has a negative impact on incomes in non-
research sectors. 
 
We tested if coefficients were significantly different in R&D activities and non-R&D 
activities. It seems that only the coefficient on former school is statistically different. 
 
 
5.2.2 Engineers. Only mathematics and physics have a positive impact on wages in non- 
research sectors compared with technology. Completing another degree after graduating in 
engineering does not bring significant wage gains in either research or non-research sectors. 
Regarding gender, the same result is found for all graduates. Wage discrimination due to 
gender early in a career in research does not seem to exist. On the other hand, a somewhat 
surprising result is the fact that relying on an organization (APEC) causes an increase in 
wages in the research sector but is not really significant (10 per cent). Finally, engineers from 
prestigious schools earn more than engineers from other schools. Indeed, being a graduate 
from a prestigious school leads to a gain of 18 per cent in research sectors and 9 per cent in 
non-research sectors. On the other hand, being a graduate from a ‘R&D school’ results in a 
positive gain (8.5 per cent, significant at 5 per cent) only in research sectors. We can note that 
only the coefficient of this variable is statistically different in R&D activities and non-R&D 
activities. 
9 The wage corresponds to the net monthly wage, plus bonuses. We recognize that this variable has limitations. Indeed, 
researchers may receive bonuses or royalties when filing a patent. 
10 ‘In “work placement”, doctors who received a CIFRE funding are not taken into account’. 
                                            
 
 
5.3 Measurement of the wage gap between the two types of activities: analysis of 
predicted wages 
 
The analysis of correlation coefficients of the estimates makes it possible to identify the 
existence of a positive or negative selection process in research sectors and non-research 
sectors. The signs of the coefficients of the different estimates are detailed in Table 8. Then, 
from the parameters of different models, conditional and counterfactual wages can be 
calculated to construct the indicators presented in Section 3.4. The counterfactual wages were 
also estimated by the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition in order to compare results. These 
results are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 6. Wage equations for doctors 
 Earnings functions Switching 
regression 
Earnings functions by OLS 
  R&D No R&D R&D No R&D 
Constant 7.367*** 7.687*** 7.535*** 7.451*** 
Previous degree     
Ref. From university     
Engineering schools 0.028 0.109* 0.008 0.077 
 (0.068) (1.88) (0.22) (1.40) 
Men 0.011 0.061 0.053 0.111* 
 (0.785) (1.06) (1.42) (2.06) 
Funding during doctorate     
Ref. Other financing     
CIFRE 0.183*** 0.220*** 0.093* 0.078 
 (3.11) (2.63) (1.81) (1.06) 
Field of study     
Ref. Engineering sciences     
Chemistry 0.053 -0.044 0.026 -0.074 
 (0.91) (0.54) (0.48) (0.94) 
Maths-Physics-Computing 0.009 0.004 0.045 0.049 
 (0.19) (0.07) (0.99) (0.85) 
Biology 0.077 0.011 0.072 -0.047 
 (1.35) (0.14) (1.34) (0.67) 
Work placement 0.092** 0.139** 0.048 0.084* 
 (2.03) (2.49) (1.15) (1.67) 
Number of months in employment 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.005** 0.006** 
 (2.94) (2.96) (2.13) (2.26) 
Ways used     
Ref. Acquaintances     
An organization -0.110 -0.165*  -0.083 
 (1.43) (1.95)  (1.13) 
A spontaneous application -0.049 -0.021  0.01 
 (0.76) (0.27)  (0.14) 
An advertisement -0.012 -0.055  -0.041 
 (0.26) (0.91)  (0.73) 
Former school 0.015 0.298***  0.175 
 (0.26) (2.56)  (1.65) 
Others 0.088 -0.041  -0.037 
 (1.52) (0.52)  (0.51) 
Career plans during doctorate     
Ref. Work in the private sector     
Work in public research -0.072* -0.094* -0.11*** -0.131*** 
 (1.77) (1.82) (2.92) (2.80) 
σ1 0.265**    
σ 0  0.302***   
σ 1 0.768***    
σ 0  0.829***   
Wald test, Prob > chi-2 0.0156    
R2   0.162 0.207 
N 345 208 137 
Notes:  Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels.  
Table 7. Wage equations for engineers 
  
 Earnings function Switching 
regression 
 Earnings function by OLS 
 R&D No R&D  R&D No R&D 
Constant  7.066*** 7.093***  7.35*** 7.193*** 
Men  0.037 0.093***  0.023 0.010*** 
 (1.02) (2.87)  (0.69) (3.42) 
Field of study      
Ref. Technology      
Maths-Physics-Computing  -0.085 0.100**  -0.245 0.017 
 (1.16) (2.30)  (0.33) (0.45) 
Agronomy  -0.058 -0.067  -0.045 -0.109** 
 (0.99) (1.41)  (0.81) (2.54) 
Other fields of 
engineering sciences  
0.001 0.001  0.013 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.25) (0.77) 
Mechanics  0.042 -0.034  -0.014 0.007 
 (0.95) (0.90)  (0.36) (0.21) 
Biology-Chemistry  -0.015 -0.037  -0.057 0.001 
 (0.24) (0.62)  (1.02) (0.01) 
Number of months in 
employment  
0.011*** 0.014***  0.011*** 0.014*** 
 (3.56) (6.05)  (3.75) (6.86) 
Ways used      
Ref. Acquaintances      
An organization  0.097* -0.068  0.057 -0.017 
 (1.75) (1.30)  (1.15) (0.35) 
A spontaneous application  -0.016 0.064  -0.023 0.057 
 (0.31) (1.50)  (0.48) (1.47) 
An advertisement  0.010 0.003  -0.012 -0.003 
 (0.24) (0.08)  (0.31) (0.10) 
Former school  0.019 -0.060  -0.03 -0.017 
 (0.34) (1.17)  (0.61) (0.37) 
Others  0.018 -0.016  0.005 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.40)  (0.11) (0.28) 
Different degree (from 
engineer’s)  
0.022 0.039  0.054 0.030 
 (0.33) (0.81)  (0.83) (0.72) 
Prestigious school  0.180*** 0.092*  0.173*** 0.131*** 
 (3.34) (1.92)  (3.46) (3.01) 
R&D school  0.084** -0.025  0.037 0.021 
 (2.16) (0.70)  (1.06) (0.63) 
s1  0.240***     
s0   0.313***    
r1  0.836***     
r0   -0.889***    
Wald test P > Chi-2  0.000    
R2      0.179 0.173 
N   714   523 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels 
  
Table 8. Wage gap between research activities and non-research activities 
 
     Estimates based on the Mover/Stayer model 
 Coefficient 
correlation 
 Oaxaca–Blinder 
decomposition 
Conditional 
wages 
Counterfactual 
wages 
Indicators 
 р1 р0  ‘Coefficient 
effect’a 
 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝟏𝟏_𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝟎𝟎_𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝟎𝟎_𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏  𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝟏𝟏_𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏 𝜫𝜫1 𝜫𝜫0 
Engineers + -  -0.01 7.70 7.70 7.26 7.35 0.444*** -0.350*** 
Doctors + +  0.046* 7.78 7.71 8.15 7.43 -0.373*** -0.277*** 
Notes: The Student test is used to determine the significance of average differences (***, **, *: significant at 1, 5, and 10%) 
a
 For comparison, we report only the second part of the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. 
 
Notes:  The Student test is used to determine the significance of average differences (***, **, 
*: significant at 1, 5, and 10%) 
a For comparison, we report only the second part of the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. 
 
5.3.1 Doctors. Estimates related to doctors reveal positive and significant correlation 
coefficients.  
 
It appears that the ‘best performers’ profiles (from their unobservable characteristics) are 
those employed in research sectors. We can conclude that the wages of a doctor who chose to 
work in research are higher on average than those of a doctor picked from the random sample. 
The indicators P1 and P0 are significantly negative. It seems that non- research sectors tend to 
offer higher wages than R&D for doctors currently working in R&D and doctors not currently 
doing research. Therefore it appears that, in the case of doctors, R&D is less lucrative than 
non-research activities. This result may suggest a ‘preference’ of doctors for research because 
doctors who are currently employed in R&D would receive higher wages (37.3 per cent) if 
they worked in non-research activities. But we are talking here of the early stages of a career 
(3 years after obtaining their PhD degree), an analysis of wages earned in the long run is 
needed to determine whether or not this difference is temporary. 
We can note that the coefficient of the R&D variable is positive and only significant at 10 per 
cent in the model estimated by Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. The difference in results 
between the two models is not surprising as it seems that doctors who are the ‘best 
performers’ work in R&D. Not taking into account selection biases tends to overstate starting 
wages in the research sector. 
It is important to remember that the estimates concern the early-career wages. The wage gap 
found between both types of activities can be interpreted in several ways. First, we can 
interpret it as ‘a learning effect’ (Moen, 2005), the young graduates acquire human capital in 
R&D activities that can then be exploited in another company or in a different position. 
Alternatively, the earning gap can be explained by an information asymmetry (Mishagina, 
2008). At the beginning of their careers, information on the productivity of young researchers 
is not available. The employer may decide to offer lower wages to individuals working in 
research compared with those working in other sectors. When information on the capabilities 
of the individual to do research is revealed, the less productive researchers move on to 
different positions, whereas the most productive stay in research and will have a higher wage 
growth. Only an analysis of the career of researchers could distinguish the different 
hypothesis. 
 
5.3.2 Engineers. Where graduates from engineering schools are concerned, it seems 
that engineers choose the activity in which they possess a relative advantage. If engineers 
who are currently in research (non-research) sectors worked in non-research (research) 
activities, their wages would be lower than those of a graduate randomly picked in the 
population who works in non-research (research) sectors. In the case of engineers, P1 is 
significantly positive whereas P0 is significantly negative. This result suggests that 
graduates from engineering schools are employed in the sector that offers the best wages. 
Indeed, engineers who are currently employed in R&D would receive lower wages if they 
worked in non-research sectors, and vice versa for engineers who are currently employed 
in non-research sectors. Unlike doctors, in the case of engineers, it does not appear that, 
early in their careers, R&D is less lucrative than non-research sectors. 
The difference in results between doctors and engineers can be explained by the fact that 
non-research positions are often a second choice for doctors. In the sample, only 21 per 
cent of doctors wanted to work in this area during their doctorate. For graduates from 
engineering schools, working in non-research sectors (production, manufacturing, 
management, etc.) is a common career choice. 
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This study shows a differentiation in the selection in R&D between doctors and graduates 
from engineering schools. Indeed, in the case of doctors, the funding the doctor received 
(CIFRE) and his/her professional experience are crucial to joining R&D. This result is similar 
to those found in other studies (Giret et al., 2007). For engineers, only the engineering school 
seems to play a role in helping them get positions in research. A graduate from an engineering 
school who maintains numerous contacts in R&D firms is more likely to become a researcher, 
and also receives higher wages in the R&D sector. In contrast, the prestige of the school does 
not seem to affect the fact of working in research. A limitation of this study is that we stand 
early in their careers. The analysis in wage differences suggests that, at the early stages of a 
career, the R&D sector is less lucrative than other sectors only for doctors, a fact that could be 
explained by the ‘taste for research’ that they seem to have. To validate this hypothesis and 
better understand the incentives for graduates to become researchers, it is necessary to extend 
this study to an analysis of wage increase and career evolution in the sector of research and 
development. 
  
Appendix A: R&D definition 
 
Are seen as working in R&D, graduates declaring the PCS11  following (Audric-Lerenard and 
Topol, 1999): 
 
383A: Electrical Engineers of Research and Development  
384A: Mechanical Engineers of Research and Development 
385A: Engineers of Research and Development for processing industries  
386A: Engineers of Research and Development for other industries  
474B: Mechanical Technicians of Research and Development 
475A: Technicians of Research and Development for processing industries  
625b: Skilled and trained laboratory staff: Food Chemistry Biology Pharmacy 
 
Appendix B: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table B1. Descriptive Statistics: doctors 
Variables R&D sector Not R&D sector Both sectors 
Degree    
From an engineering school  33.6 23.3 29.6 
From a university  66.3 76.6 70.4 
Gender    
Men  65.9 77.4 70.4 
Women  34.1 22.6 29.6 
Funding    
CIFRE  27.9 13.9 22.3 
Subject    
Biology  26.4 21.9 24.6 
Chemistry  20.2 13.9 17.7 
Mathematics-Physics-Computing  30.3 43.8 35.7 
Engineering sciences  23.1 20.4 22.0 
Career plans during doctorate    
Work in public research  37 37.2 37.1 
Work placement  39.4 35.8 38 
Post-doctorate  40.9 24.8 34.5 
Hired thanks to    
A spontaneous application  9.1 11.7 10.1 
An organization  5.8 11.7 8.1 
One of your acquaintances  34.6 35.0 34.8 
An advertisement  24.0 24.8 24.3 
Your former school  13.9 5.1 10.4 
Others  12.5 11.7 12.2 
Career plans before finishing high school (baccalauréat)    
To work in research or science  46.6 37.9 43.2 
To become an engineer  13.0 7.3 10.7 
To work in computing  2.9 10.9 6.1 
Other project  22.1 26.3 23.8 
No plans  15.4 17.5 16.2 
 
  
11 The PCS are socio-professional categories determined by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies 
(INSEE). 
                                            
Table B2. Descriptive statistics: graduates of engineering schools 
 
Variables R&D 
sector 
Not R&D 
sector 
Both 
sectors 
Gender    
Men  79.0 76.2 77.0 
Field of study    
Biology-Chemistry  8.9 5.9 6.7 
Agronomy  9.4 13.0 12.0 
Mathematics-Physics-Computing  4.7 18.2 14.6 
Technology  26.7 25.0 25.5 
Mechanics  38.2 22.0 26.3 
Other fields of engineering 
sciences  
12.0 15.9 14.8 
Hired thanks to    
A spontaneous application  13.1 15.1 14.6 
An organization  12.0 7.8 9.0 
One of your acquaintances  20.9 22.9 22.4 
An advertisement  24.6 26.2 25.8 
Your former school  11.5 8.6 9.4 
Others  17.8 19.3 18.9 
Career plans before finishing 
high school (baccalauréat) 
   
To work in research or science  9.9 10.5 10.4 
To become an engineer  35.6 20.1 24.2 
To work in computing  3.7 14.0 11.2 
Other project  36.1 34.8 35.2 
No plans  14.7 20.7 19.0 
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